Investigation of the Battle of Issus by time sequence

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イッソスの戦いの関係場所

1. Introduction
In the summer of 338 BC, the kingdom of Macedonia, which arose in the northern part of Greece, defeated the allied forces of Greece at the Battle of Chaeronea, and became the leader of the Corinth alliance, praising its hegemony over the Greek world. However, in the summer of 336 BC, Philip II was assassinated and his son Alexandros became king of Macedonia. Alexandros defeated the surrounding tribes that threatened the security of the kingdom one after another, and tried to solidify the foundation of his rule. In the course of his expedition, he utterly destroyed Thebes, who had rebelled against Macedonia, and made an example to the Greek Polis, which had lost their power in the past. In the spring of 334 BC, Alexandros, now the leader of the Corinth League, embarked on an expedition to the east, a long-cherished dream of many Greeks, including his father, Philip.
The Battle of Issus, the first battle between Darius III of Achaemenid Persia at the time and Alexander III, who led the allied forces of Greece, is described in many books, but one thing that almost agrees is that it was an "unprecedented crossing", caused by chance, due to the advance towards the enemy, with the result that the army of Darius appeared behind the army of Alexandros. However, a closer look at ancient sources reveals that Alexander the Great's meticulous calculations lie behind it.
The surviving sources on the Battle of Issus date from the Roman period and are attributed to six historians. Polybius (2nd century BC), Diodorus Siculus (1st century BC), Curtius Rufus (Late 1st century AD), Flavius Arrianus (First half of 2nd century AD), Plutarch (First half of 2nd century AD) and Junianus Justinus (3rd century AD). All of them are based on primary historical materials left by Aristoboulos, who participated in Alexander the Great's expedition to the east as an engineer, and Ptolemy, the future king of Egypt, who directly witnessed the Battle of Issus. However, Justinus only wrote an excerpt based on the "History of Philip" written by Pompeius Trogus, an ancient Roman historian of the late 1st century BC, extracting only the parts that interest him, but Issus there are very few excerpts in the battle part, which is very disappointing.
In order to estimate the progress up to the battle with specific dates, I would like to set two Basis Dates.
The first is the arrival date of Alexandros in Tarsos, the center of the Cilicia region.
The day Alexandros arrived at Tarsos was undoubtedly mid-summer, although it was not the hottest on record, as "it was summer and the coast of Cilicia was particularly hot due to the heat of the sun." [1]
The highest temperature at Tarsos since modern meteorological observations began was 42°C, observed for three days between July 29th and August 6th. Assuming that August 2nd, which is in the middle of this date, is the date of arrival of Alexandros in Tarsos, I would like to set it as the Basis Date 1.
The second is the date of the Battle of Issus.
The battle is said to have taken place in "the month Maimaoterion, when Nicostratus was archon of the Athenians", mid-October to mid-November 333 BC in the present calendar year. [2]
It is also recorded that it was snowing when Parmenion seized the goods sent by Darius' army to Damaskos. [3]
Damaskos has an average maximum temperature of 17°C and an average minimum temperature of 2°C in mid-November. It is about 385 km from Issus to Damaskos. If the Parmenion had been accompanied by infantry, it would have taken 15 days to march every day. Considering this, the march was completely halted to request reinforcements, so it is thought that it took about the same number of days. [4]
Therefore, I would like to presume that the date of the battle was November 1st, and use it as the Basis Date 2.

2. Memnon's death from illness
After crossing the Hellespontus Strait, Alexandros joined Parmenion, who had been sent ahead by his father Philip with an army of at least 10,000 men in the spring of 336 B.C., in the battle of the Granikos River, where he defeated the Persian Empire's Asia Minor satraps allied army. [5].
Alexandros then seized the goods stockpiled at Sardeis in Lydia, where the governorate of Asia Minor was located, secured money for the expedition, which was said to last only 30 days at the time of the expedition's departure, captured the Persian bases one after another, and winterized at Gordion [6].
The reason for not attacking Cilicia immediately to the south was that Memnon, a Persian mercenary captain, was leading a navy to the mainland Greece, and Orontobates, satrap of Karia, was rallying the Persian forces at Halikarnassos, which had been chased from various parts of Greece, to put up a fierce resistance. The Persian forces were chased from various parts of the country to Halikarnassos. [7].
Another reason was that he was waiting to join the Parmenion troops they had sent to Phrygia and to arrive with the newlyweds they had sent home temporarily from Karia to Macedonia and the new recruits who were to come with them. [8].

However, in the spring of 333 B.C., when the Orontobates returned with their newly recruited cavalry and infantry, despite continued resistance, they began a campaign to mop up the remaining Persian forces in the Kappadokia region east of the Halys River. [9].
Memnon, who had positioned Halikarnassos as the last stronghold for the defense of Asia Minor and was engaged in an all-out resistance campaign, incinerated the city before it fell into the hands of Alexandros' forces and moved his base to a surrounding fortress [10]. Leaving resistance on land to the Orontobates, Memnon himself became a man-at-arms, taking a force of mercenaries with him into the fleet. Memnon, who had been appointed fleet commander by Darius earlier, seized the islands that served as staging posts for Alexandros' forces' sea transport, cutting off logistical routes and forcing the Greece mercenary force to land on the Greece mainland and target Macedonia's home country, forcing Alexandros, the plan was to force Alexandros to return home. [11]
However, during the time it took to capture Mitylene on Lesbos, Memnon himself, who was an integral part of this operation, died of illness. [12].
Fate has always smiled on Alexandros, but never more than on this occasion was Alexandros pleased. If Memnon's plan had been carried out, the battle that would erupt two years later between Agis, King of Sparta, and Antipatros, commander of Macedonia's detachment, would have been fought earlier, with twice as many men on Agis' side, and Antipatros would have been defeated. Antipatros was defeated and Alexandros would have been forced to return home in a hurry. [13].
The Agis forces at this time numbered 20,000 infantry, including 8,000 Greece mercenaries, and 2,000 cavalry. [14].
Antipatros, on the other hand, opposes with no less than 40,000 men, and Agis is killed in battle. [15].
The date of this Memnon's death is unknown, but it was reported to Alexandros that he was active in the provinces of Pamphylia and Kappadokia. [16]
The death of the commander-in-chief would have been a great loss to his own army, so it was usually kept secret and should not have reached Alexandros immediately. Knowing this, however, Alexandros advanced to Cilicia and arrived at Tarsos on the Basis Date 1. From Memnon's death until it reaches Alexandros and reaches Tarsos, we estimate 13 days, and we estimate Memnon's death as July 20, 333 B.C. This shall be the Basis Date 0.
It took 3 days for Memnon's death to be communicated to those of Alexandros' army who were active around Lesbos, 4 days for the courier to deliver it to Alexandros near Kappadokia, and 6 days for the march to reach Tarsos.

3. Darius' resolution
The news of Memnon's death was delivered to Darius on July 30, considered ten days after the Basis Date 0. At that time, the "Royal Road" from Sardeis to Kappadokia was under control by Alexandros' forces, but the post station east of Cilicia would have been in good condition and functioning. Of the 111 post stations, 63 post stations functioned as relay races. [17]
If it worked perfectly, it would have taken 7 days in total, so the usable part at that time was 4 days from Cilicia's inn station. Even if the messenger was dispatched immediately after Memnon's death from disease, it took six days for the messenger to arrive from Lesbos Island to the post station in Cilicia, since the Asia Minor area was hostile territory. It would have been possible to gallop by sea along the Euphrates River by sea without using the "Royal Road", but it would have taken many more days.

There is no record of where Darius received the news of Memnon's death, but it is believed to have been at Susa. In the midst of the summer heat, we would normally have been in Ekbatana, the summer capital. [18]
Plutarch states that Darius marched from Susa, and may have been at Susa or beyond at Persepolis or Ekbatana.
However, if Darius was in a place other than Susa, considering the number of march days, etc., it will not be in time for the army's departure from Babylon.
The "Royal Road" was constructed from Sardeis to Susa, and Susa was the capital of the Persian empire that governed government affairs.
Darius debated with his aides at Susa whether to continue with Memnon's campaign or to step out and fight the decisive battle himself, the latter being adopted. [19]
In the 390s BC, King Agesilaos of Sparta, during his expedition to Asia Minor, caused a conflict in his home country by taking over and forced him to return home. However, this time the Greek Polis did not have the strength to fight, and each Polis was taken hostage by the Eastern Expeditionary Army, so it was probably not possible to bribe them. [20]
Also, without Memnon, it would not have been possible to deal with Antipatros, the homeland of Macedonia. Also, even with Memnon in command, it was probably impossible for a force without cavalry to attack the enemy and destroy them irretrievably.
Therefore, it is presumed that the contents of Darius' instruction were as follows.
(1) Pharnabazos, son of Artabazos, will be the commander of the fleet. [21]

(2) Pharnabazos to continue the blockade operation with Autophradates. [22]

(3) Pharnabazos entrust Thymondas with a mercenary force. [23]
Pharnabazos entrusted the mercenaries who were besieging Lesbos to Thymondas, son of Mentor, who was in Lycia at the time, and returned to Lesbos again. [24]
Thymondas assembled a force of Greek mercenaries who were resisting the remnants of Alexandros' army near Lycia and sailed south with his fleet, landing at Tripolis in Phenicia. [25]

(4) Thymondas to land a mercenary force and rendezvous with the main force at Sochoi. [26]
As for the location of Sochoi, it is in the Assyria region and is only known to be about two days away from the Syrian Gates, but it seems to be halfway between the Syrian Gates and Aleppo. [27]
To stray far from this ancient highway and await the forces of Alexandros would be dangerous enough, and the speed of the forces of Alexandros would have made it possible to storm Babylon. South of Sochoi there was such a fertile country that Seleukos later fed his army with 500 war elephants, which would have provided sufficient food for Darius' army. [28]

(5) All the nations of the empire must lead their forces to the outskirts of Babylon.
The Bactrians, Sogdianians, the inhabitants of Red Sea (Indians), etc. did not arrive in time for the meeting, but judging from the fact that they were late and did not rush to the meeting, it seems that for some reason they sped up their departure well before the deadline for the meeting. [29]
If the main unit had departed about a week earlier, it would have been possible to join them at Sochoi, so it is presumed that the main unit departed more than two weeks earlier than the scheduled departure date.
At the convocation of Gaugamela two years later, the Bactrians and others had gathered at Babylon earlier than many other races, and this may have played a role. [30]

(6) Syrian troops hold down the Syrian Gates and stop the enemy from entering.
After the Battle of Issus, when Parmenion went to Damaskos to take over the goods, it is reported that the Syrian satrap had already returned, and it seems that once the outcome of the Battle of Issus was known, he had quickly fled back. [31]
Syria's forces were so large that Parmenion, alarmed by the number of enemies, tried to call in reinforcements. At the time of Cyrus the Younger's rebellion, Abrocomas, the satrap of Phoenicia, reportedly commanded an army of 300,000 men, no doubt a considerable number of them. [32]

(7) The Egyptian unit should wait for the arrival of the main unit before Sochoi.
There are no Egyptian ethnic names for the Babylon congregation, which Curtius describes in detail. [33]
However, the Persian war dead at Issus included the name of the Egyptian satrap Sabaces, and it is believed that Egyptian troops were also involved in the battle at Issus. [34]

4. Alexandros' foray into Cilicia and Parmenion's Starting for the Syrian Gates
Encouraged by the news of Memnon's death, Alexandros decided to head south with the main force.
To reach the Cilicia region in the southern part of the Asia Minor, his army cannot go south unless it crosses the Cilician gates (about 1,300m above sea level) in the Tauros Mountains. In 401 BC Cyrus the Younger's forces also passed through here. Xenophon describes the barrier here as "allowable for wagons, but terribly steep, and impossible for an army to pass if blocked by the enemy." [35]
The length of the barrier was about 20 stadia (about 3.7 km), and the castle wall extended from the steep mountainside to block the road, and there were gates in several places. [36]
With the main force waiting in front of the gate with Parmenion, a light force led by Alexandros himself storms the gate. The garrison of Arsames, the satrap of Cilicia, abandons the gates without a fight, and Alexandros leads his entire army across the Cilician gates the next morning, but hears that Arsames intends to destroy Tarsos and withdraw with light troops and hastened to Tarsos. [37]
Alexandros arrived at Tarsos after a two-day journey. He fell ill at this time from exhaustion and bathing in the cool Kydnos River during the hottest part of summer. [38]
The name of the disease is presumed to be acute pneumonia or malaria fever. He crossed the gate at dawn and arrived at Tarsos during the hottest time of the day. The distance he ran down in about 8 hours was 500 stadia (about 92.5 km). [39]
Next, of Parmenion's departure to the Syrian Gates, only Arrianus tells us that it was shortly before Alexandros' departure from Tarsos. [40]
However, it is said that Alexandros, who was battling an illness in Tarsos, received a letter from Parmenion, who was supposed to be in Tarsos, telling him to beware of the doctor Philip. Plutarch says it came from "the camp", Justinus says it came from "Kappadokia". [41]
However, only Curtius writes from the "starting pitcher", and it is presumed that Parmenion was made to start before Alexandros fell ill. [42]
According to Curtius, Parmenion was dispatched on the day of his arrival in Tarsos to stop the Scorched Earth Plan of Arsames, satrap of Cilicia. It is believed that this was the starting line-up, and that troops were later dispatched one after another.
Giving the date of Parmenion's departure to shortly before Alexandros's departure from Tarsos seems too lenient to an enemy who might come at any moment.
Arrianus' account of the timing of the advance is unreliable, but he states that the forces that started with Parmenion were 17,500 Greek allied infantry, 2,300 Greek mercenaries, 7,000 Thracians under Sitarces and 1,850 Thessalian cavalry. [43]
26,800 infantry, 1,850 cavalry, totaling 28,650. A whopping 60% of the forces of Alexandros who crossed the Cilician gates.
Before the Syrian Gates, 5 Parasangs (about 27.6 km) from Issus, there was a defile called "Pillar of Jonah". The barrier was a cliff on the east side and Issus Bay on the west side, and was usually guarded by the garrison of the satrap of Cilicia on the north side and the garrison under the direct control of the Great King on the south side, making it difficult to pass. [44]
However, while in Gordion, a rebuilt fleet was nearby for logistical support under orders from Alexandros. [45]
Parmenion's advance force is presumed to have passed without resistance in the same way that Cyrus the Younger had passed through the defile. [46]
Parmenion's advance forces moved from the present-day city of Iskenderun on the Gulf of Issus to the Syrian Gates, a defile in the Amanos Mountains, where they repelled the Persian garrison. This barrier was 3 stadia (about 555 m) long, and it was possible to block the road with a retractable gate attached to the castle wall. [47]
It is presumed that the other side of the barrier was already guarded by an army led by the Syrian satrap. [48]
It seems that Parmenion's advance force did not need to dare to break through the barrier, and was only tasked to prevent Darius' army from advancing to the sea side.
Parmenion is believed to have arrived at the Syrian Gates on August 11th.
From Tarsos to the gates, it would have taken nine days at normal marching speed, but it would have taken about the same number of days when considering the infantry's march through the enemy and the rapidity of the task.

5. Babylon Departure of Darius
The date when Darius ordered the nations of the empire to assemble at Babylon is unknown. Darius, however, would not have waited for the arrival of the Indian war elephants who had taken part in the Battle of Gaugamela, but would have at least expected the strength of the Baktria cavalry, the strongest of the Persian army.
It is therefore presumed that the date of assembly ordered by Darius was a deadline that allowed for the arrival of the Baktria cavalry force.
The distance between Susa and Baktria is about 1,510 km.
Even with the Persian messenger system, the fastest in the world at the time, it would have taken nine days for the convocation order to reach Baktria. [49]
At the Battle of Gaugamela, 8,000 Baktrian cavalry are involved. [50]
After receiving the order, it took seven days to muster troops from various parts of the Baktria region.
The distance between Baktria and Babylon is about 1,875km. 38 days from Baktria to Babylon. A total of 54 days is required. In order to gather troops from Massagetai and India, which are far from Baktria, more than two months had to be expected from the call-up decision on July 30th.
Therefore, it is presumed that the convocation date for Babylon was the end of September.
However, Darius was forced to leave before the due date for some circumstances. The "circumstances" may have been the news of Alexandros' sudden illness, but it was before the crossing of Euphrates and after leaving Babylon that Darius received the news. [51]
The "circumstances" seem to have been the news that the Parmenion's advance troops contacted the garrison under the direct control of the Syrian Gates, and that the Alexandros army would directly attack Mesopotamia. While using Sochoi as a rallying point, they had to intercept the Alexandros army in front of it. According to the news from the garrison under the direct control of the Great King of the Syrian Gates, it is presumed that they hurriedly departed Babylon around August 21st.
When Darius left Babylon, he had 250,000 infantry and 62,200 cavalry.
He imitated Xerxes at the time of the invasion of Greece, preparing a fenced area for 10,000 people, likening it to a huge box, putting them in order and counting them before leaving. [52]
Curtius mentions that this was joined by 30,000 Greek mercenaries, but this could be interpreted as a later addition rather than at the time of departure, probably the mercenary force that Thymondas brought to Sochoi.
Curtius records in detail the situation at the time of Babylon's departure, but I cannot find any national troops in it. [53]
Presumably, in anticipation of an enemy encounter, he sent them several days ahead as a deterrent and scout. In fact, considering the lines of the march, the army was so large that even if the front group left at dawn, the last group would not leave until after sunset. They should have sent out the whole army in several days. As it took five days to cross the Euphrates, he may have marched with his whole force in five divisions. [54]

When Babylon departed, they marched at a slightly faster pace, but while they were marching, word came that Alexandros was suddenly ill, and Darius hurried his army. It is about 670km from Babylon to Thapsakos, the river crossing point. In a normal march, it would take 28 days, but in consideration of the major pauses along the way and the activities of the enemy, it will take 37 days to reach the river crossing point, and the river crossing will be completed on September 28th. Darius received news of Alexandros' sudden illness not immediately after Babylon's departure, but near the river crossing on September 23rd. Sochoi arrival will be October 9th.

6. Alexandros' Departure from Tarsos and the Cilicia Trachea Suppression Operation
Alexandros rested his army at Tarsos and was himself recuperating from his illness, while Parmenion's advance troops watched the approach of Darius' army. And when his recuperation was over, he carried out a campaign against Cilicia Trachea.
He may have been asked by the remnants of Halikarnassos to subjugate the neighboring tribes of Pisidia and Lycia, who came to the enemy's aid, from the Cilicia side. Alternatively, it may have been to pacify an area that he himself had left untouched in the previous autumn and winter pacification operations.
Leaving Tarsos, Alexandros reached the town of Soloi, a strategic point on the plain Cilicia, by way of Anchialos. [55]
The mountains punitive force consisted of 3 units of the Macedonian infantry, or 4,500 heavy infantry troops called Pezhetairoi (fellow infantry soldiers). It was an infantry unit of 5,500 soldiers, consisting of 500 all archers and 500 Agrianes. On the other hand, the troops that remained in Soloi consisted of 3,000 soldiers of the Guards Infantry, called Hypaspists (holding a shield), 7,324 of the rest of the Pezhetairoi (fellow infantry), 2,050 of the cavalry, called Hetairoi (fellow cavalry), 400 of the Greek Union cavalry, 1,200 of the Thrace cavalry, 10,324 of the infantry, 3,650 of the cavalry, a total of 13,974.
The mountains punitive force left Soloi and advanced along the coast, reaching the mouth of the Calycadnus River. At the mouth of the Calycadnus was the town of Hormoi (now Slifke). [56]
From Hormoi, he advanced his army upstream along the Calycadnus River, aiming to establish a base for punitive operations. It is stated that the operation to subdue Cilicia Trachea took seven days, but it is not clear from this sentence whether it was the period from the departure of Soloi to its return, or whether it was the actual number of days it took to subdue it without including the number of days along the way. [57]
However, if it is the former, it is far too short compared to the 10 days it took to subdue the Arabians during the capture of Tyre and the 30 days it took to subdue the hill dwellers in the Zagrus mountains such as Mardoi during Persepolis. [58]
The conquest of the Arabians was the conquest of a bandit with a foothold in Antilibanos, and while it took only one day to reach the area of operation, it took six days each way to reach the area of operation at Cilicia Trachea, and after all, seven days seems more appropriate as the number of days required for the actual conquest. From now on, I would like to use that judgment to estimate the actions of the mountains punitive force.
The base of the punitive campaign would be Laranda (now Karaman), the center of the Pisidia region.

Laranda was the town where Balakros, later appointed satrap of Cilicia by Alexandros, was killed in battle trying to suppress the rebellion, and from Laranda there is a road connecting Iconion and the town of Tada, just before the Cilicia Gate, through which Cyrus the Younger's forces passed. [59]
Accompanied by the wife of Cilician satrap, who was returning to Tarsos after meeting Cyrus the Younger separately from the main unit of Cyrus the Younger, a unit led by Menon, a Thessalian, arrives at Tarsos by a shortcut over the Tauros Mountains. [60]
Cyrus the Younger, using the regular route, had a nine-day march, a four-day break, and arrived at Tarsos on day 13, but Menon arrived five days earlier, so it was probably an eight-day journey. [61]
From where Menon parted with Cyrus the Younger, it takes one day to get to Laranda, three days from Hormoi over the mountain to Tarsos, and four days from Laranda to Hormoi. On his way, Menon was attacked by bandits and marched hurriedly, feeling the enemy behind him. [62]
From Hormoi to Laranda, it is also a 1,600 m ascent from the coastline, and it is considered to be a normal march to enemy territory, taking six days. The return journey is estimated to take five days.
They took control of Cilicia Trachea by force or by agreement for seven days around Laranda. Menon of Cyrus the Younger forces passed through the region with 1,000 heavy infantry and 500 light infantry, losing 100 heavy infantry along the way. [63]
Along with Laranda, the Pisidia regions, such as Derbe and Isaura, were home to bandits who roosted in caves high in the Tauros Mountains even in Roman times, and there were many pirate forts along the Mediterranean coast. [64]
It is estimated that the Mountains punitive force arrived in Soloi from Laranda via Hormoi on October 16th.

7. Thymondas Greek Mercenary Corps
Orders from Darius were delivered to Pharnabazos and Thymondas respectively. The directive is estimated to have arrived on August 16th, 16 days after Darius' policy decision date.
Pharnabazos, commander of the Persian Imperial Fleet who succeeded Memnon, was carrying out a strategy to turn the islands of the Aegean Sea back to the Persian side and cut off the supply routes of Alexandros' army. However, Mitylene of Lesbos resisted stubbornly, and he laid siege to the town.

Pharnabazos hastened to make a pact with the citizens of Mitylene, which resulted in the fall of Mitylene. [65]
The date of the fall is presumed to be September 9th, counting back from the date Darius arrived at Sochoi and the date Soloi was informed of Ptolemy's victory.
Shortly after this he sailed to Lycia to hand over many of the Greek mercenaries engaged in the siege to Mentor's son Thymondas. [66]
The distance between Lesbos and Lycia is about 620 km.
Nearchos, the son of Androtimos, traveled about 75km in one day on his Indian Ocean voyage. Therefore, assuming that the journey will take 13 days (Large break 4 days), it is estimated that the flight will leave Lesbos on September 11th and arrive in Lycia on September 24th.
Meanwhile, Thymondas, who was in Lycia, also received orders from Darius to gather together a Greek mercenary force on resistance in Karia and elsewhere, and wait for Pharnabazos in Lycia. When he received from Pharnabazos a unit of Greek mercenaries on Lesbos, he went to Tripolis in Phoenicia by sea with the mercenaries he had raked up. The distance between Lycia and Tripolis is about 520 km. It takes 10 days (Large break 3 days) if he stop at Cyprus on the way.
Thymondas landed in Tripolis on October 4th. [67]
From there, he headed further overland to Sochoi. The distance between Tripolis and Sochoi is about 295 km.
Because Thymondas' forces were heavily armed, Sochoi's arrival is estimated to be October 19th, assuming that it took 15 days (Large break 3 days). [68].
As a result, the Persian resistance forces of Halikarnassos in Karia were annihilated for the remaining forces of the Alexandros army. [69]
Ptolemy sent many of his garrisons to Issus to take part in the decisive battle against the Darius forces.

8. Soloi Departure of the Alexandros Army
The subjugation of Cilicia Trachea was deeply related to the movements of Asia Minor, which was still not in complete control. This operation was different in nature from a simple punitive expedition against bandits, such as the one to subdue the Arabians during the siege of Tyre, and the main objective might have been to support the flank of the allied forces during the ongoing campaign to capture resistance cities in Asia Minor. [70]
It seems that the cities were closely connected, as relief forces rushed in from the Pisidian town of Telmissos when the Pisidian town of Sagalassos was under attack by the Alexandros army, and it would have been very effective for the Mountains punitive force to hit the stronghold directly from the Cilicia side during this period. [71]
While it may not be known or true where they actually sent their support troops from Laranda or Isaura, the reality is that if they were attacked extensively at the same time, they would not be able to seek relief or escape elsewhere.
In addition, although the advance of the Alexandros forces from Phrygia across the Tauros Mountains to Cilicia was made possible by the death of Memnon, who had contributed greatly to the Persian Empire's control over the western side, it did not wipe out the resistance forces on the Persian side, and some of the major cities and islands along the Asia Minor coast, which would serve as a supply base for the Persian Navy, were resisting the Alexandros forces, and it would have been strategically impossible to leave Cilicia until they were completely overrun. Shortly after their return to Soloi came reports that Ptolemy and others had defeated the Persians, led by Orontobates, Karian satrap. [72]
This was what Alexandros has been waiting for. Although not completely pacified, the Asia Minor was expected to slaughter 700 infantrymen and 50 cavalrymen and take over 1,000 prisoners, so that any apparent resistance would disappear for some time. [73]
The defeated Orontobates escaped to Babylon and commanded the Persian forces at Gaugamela, but it seems they were too late for the Battle of Issus. [74]
Alexandros himself may not actually have expeditioned for the Cilicia Mountains subjugation. He may have been recuperating at Soloi. For the march of troops to the Cilicia Mountains only conveys the fact that Arrianus alone took place, and in Soloi to thank Asclepius, the god of medicine, for recovering from his illness and regaining health. because they are making sacrifices. In Soloi, review ceremonies, torch competitions, physical education competitions, etc. are held to raise the morale of the soldiers and enhance their physical strength. [75]
Although it is not recorded in the historical materials, it is quite possible that Alexandros visited the sanctuary of Zeus in the town of Orbe on the mountain side near Soloi. It also meant the last big break before. [76]
Soloi departure would be October 19th, estimated 13 days before the Basis Date 2.
Alexandros sends the Philotas cavalry from Soloi to build a bridge over the Pyramos River, which will be crossed near Mallos. [77]
The hoplites and other main forces headed straight for Mallos, but this time they took hostages the inhabitants of Soloi, who might have sided with Darius and attacked from behind. [78]
A bodyguard of infantry and cavalry, led by Alexandros himself, stopped at the town of Magarsos and made a sacrifice to the Magarsian Athena, god of war, of justice and strategy, before heading for Mallos. Arrival at Mallos is estimated on October 23rd. [79]

9. Arrival of the Darius army in Sochoi and Alexandros' strategy
They joined the main unit and the Philotas cavalry at Mallos and performed sacrifices for the hero god Amphilochus, who died fighting Apollo on the nearby Aleian Plain. [80]
The circumstances of Darius's arrival in Sochoi are not documented in historical sources and details are unknown, but Alexandros learned of it while he was in Mallos. The Parmenion courier reports that Darius is encamped in Sochoi, two days from the Syrian Gates. [81]
Based on this, Darius' arrival in Sochi is estimated to be October 9th.

So where did they get the information on Darius' arrival in Sochi? Did he hear it from the mouth of a merchant who was able to pass through the Syrian Gates, which was completely closed by the garrisons of both armies? Both armies were accompanied by military merchants, and it seems that shops were also opened in the army, so that merchants might have been able to pass freely through the barrier gates. [82]
Or were they informed by unclosed sea routes? Myriandrus, two days south of Issus, appears to have been a commercial center and a port city for the Phoenicians with a large number of merchant ships in and out, and letters from outside. [83]
But rather than relying on these unreliable sources, Alexandros would have dispatched trusted soldiers to monitor Darius' approach. Later, Alexandros made possible the impossible in Sogdiana, such as climbing sheer rocks, and capturing Aornos, which was said to be impregnable. [84]
Alexandros' scouts would have watched from a 1,600m peak near the Syrian Gates, or even crossed the mountain via animal trails.
What kind of strategy did Alexandros make after receiving news of Darius' arrival in Sochoi?
What matters here is whether Alexandros "knew about the Amanos Gate." The 'Amanos Gate' may be interpreted as the Bahce Pass, as described below, or the Hasanbeyli Pass a little further south, but it may be better described as a derelict pass between mountains about 300 m high on the east side of Toprakkale, a day's journey north of the town of Issus.
For Curtius tells us that it was on the same night that Alexandros entered Syria through the Pillar of Jonah and Darius reached the Gate of Amanos. [85]
If they identified the Bahce or Hasanbeyli passes as the "Amanos Gate," the Alexandros would have to stay near Myriandrus for about five days. Unlike previous versions of the Cilician gates, Pillar of Jonah, and the Syrian Gates, which had several retractable gates on their walls and garrisons to keep the enemy from entering, the Amanos Gate may not have had such a facility and was just a defile.
However, as long as it was named "Gate," it must have been located on a major traffic route from ancient times with heavy traffic. It's hard to imagine Parmenion missing out after spending nearly three months searching the region for " defiles." [86]
The inhabitants of Issus had forsaken the few Macedonians and provided food and other supplies to the Persian army. [87]
But that was after Darius had brought a large army to the town of Issus, suggesting that at first they were favouring the Alexandros army. They also apparently cooperated with Parmenion, who was exploring the defile. What we can say with certainty here is that Alexandros was aware of the existence of "the Amanos Gate."

But if he didn't know, Alexandros probably thought of one of two.
(1) Intercept at the Syrian Gates
To intercept a large army with the Syrian Gates as a barrier. There are two big negatives to this.
First of all, this operation is meaningless if the enemy does not attack. Also, it would be unthinkable given Alexandros' aggressive and resolute personality.
Second, and I think the crucial factor, is that Darius himself is very likely to get away with it.

(2) Attack Darius across the Syrian Gates
Surprise Darius encamped at Sochoi across the Syrian Gates. There are also two negatives to this.
First of all, it completely ignores Curtius, who reports that the council decided to wait for the enemy in "the defiles of the mountains." [88]
Secondly, Arrianus is said to have been stopped by the occasional storm, but later in the Battle of Porus in India, despite the heavy rain accompanied by thunder, he managed to cross the river Hydaspes and made a successful surprise attack. It is inconceivable that Alexandros did not take advantage of the bad weather. [89]

Next, what if he "knew" the existence of the Amanos Gate? Again, the question is whether he knew that Darius' army had left Sochoi for the Amanos Gate. If he "didn't know" about Sochoi's departure, Alexandros thought one of two.
One is when he never expected the enemy to come from the Amanos Gate, but the strategy would be similar to the above-mentioned case of "not knowing" the existence of the Amanos Gate.
Second, if he cross the "Pillar of Jonah" and exit into Syria, anticipating the enemy coming from the Amanos Gate, it will be the same as "the Last Remaining Strategy" described below.

Finally, what if we knew of the existence of the Amanos Gate and of the enemy coming from that direction? There are also two options for this.
One is to cross the Syrian Gates, where Alexandros' forces, in high spirits to engage Darius, would not go where they already knew the enemy's main force was clear.
The second is "the Last Remaining Strategy". In other words, he learned that Darius' army was about to enter Issus through the Amanos Gate, crossed the Pillar of Jonah into Syria, and he expected Darius' army to camp in front of the barrier before crossing the Pillar of Jonah, and it was a strategy to challenge Darius in the isthmus of Issus.

Alexandros convenes a conference at Mallos to announce the arrival of Darius' army in Sochoi and to raise the morale of the army. [90]
In addition, Alexandros joined Parmenion in the town of Castabalum on the north side of Issus Bay and received a detailed report on the situation near Issus. [91]
The council discussed whether to proceed further in the next town of Issus. [92]
At that meeting, Parmenion, who had been searching the surrounding area for nearly three months, offered his opinion, proposing that the "defiles" was the most suitable place to intercept Darius' army, and was adopted. [93]
In the records of Arrianus, Curtius, and others, there are passages in which Parmenion gives his opinion on operations, but these are often rejected by Alexandros. However, the adoption of the opinion that this "defiles" is decided on the battlefield is peculiar, and on the contrary, it seems to be extremely credible. The "defiles" suggested by Parmenion can be compared to the "Pillar of Jonah" and "the Syrian Gates."
However, it is not appropriate because there is no record that the checkpoint was chosen as the place of confrontation even when looking at the character of Alexandros, who longed for a direct confrontation with Darius, and the progress of the eastern expedition. There is no doubt that the "defiles" here refers to the "Issus Isthmus" which is only 14 stadia (about 2.59 km) wide. We can also understand from the fact that the decisive battle was to be held at "the defiles" that Alexandros prayed for when he heard the scouts' report that Darius' army had advanced near Issus. [94]
However, it seems to contradict this presumption that several Macedonian wounded were left behind in the town of Issus, where the enemy knew to be imminent. It is possible that Alexandros, upon receiving word of the departure of Darius' forces from Sochoi, misread the enemy's estimated date of arrival in Issus. It is said that Alexandros was surprised by the advance of Darius' army on Issus. The arrival of the Darius army may have been so unexpectedly early that the wounded, who were supposed to follow the main force, did not arrive in time. [95]

10. The Dangers of Alexandros' Strategy
There have been three battles in history named "Battle of Issus".
The second, in 194 AD, was a battle between Severus and Niger, governor of Syria, for the position of Roman emperor. Severus' forces advanced from the west and defeated the Niger forces in two places in the Asia Minor. He continued on to Cilicia and met with the Niger army near a place called the Gate. It seems to refer to the "Pillar of Jonah", the defile between Issus and Myriandrus.
"A cliff on one side and a cliff that drops into the sea on the other," said the Roman historian Dio Cassius, not "the Syrian Gates," a defile in the Amanos Mountains. The Severus army, coming from the direction of Issus in the north, clashes with the Niger army, which is positioned on a small hill in front of the Pillar of Jonah. Both armies had heavy infantry in the front row and light infantry such as archers in the back row, and it was a battle where the one who overwhelmed the enemy in a narrow space won.
At first, the Niger forces had the upper hand due to superiority in numbers and location, but a sudden thunderstorm accompanied by a northerly wind struck the Niger forces, turning Severus into victorious. The Niger army was overwhelmed by the Severus army and abandoned the battlefield, fleeing towards Syria. [96]

For the third time, in 622 AD, the Eastern Roman emperor Heraclius, during his campaign against Sassanid Persia, clashed near Issus with Persian forces trying to stop the invasion. The Persians await near Issus as Heraclius advances across the Tauros Mountains. Heraclius was victorious when the Persian army was pushed behind him by troops landed from his fleet. The landing site is thought to be Myriandrus. Heraclius, whose father was a governor of Carthage, led a fleet from Carthage to dethrone the previous emperor, making good use of his naval power.

In both cases, the side that tried to move out of Cilicia towards Syria, like Alexandros' army, won. However, considering the lineup, it was the opposite of Alexandros' case. In other words, the winner was located on the north side. So why did Alexandros leave "Pillar of Jonah" for Syria once? I think there was a deep reading of Alexandros in this. The field of Issus, the battlefield, is an isthmus between the Amanos Mountains and the Issus Bay, forming an inverted triangle when viewed from the north.
In a real battle, Alexandros' forces move from the lower apex to the upper base, gradually spreading their wings left and right toward Darius' forces. If this were the other way around, Darius' army, much more numerous, would find it easier and easier to encircle the enemy from the left and right, and would be extremely disadvantageous to the army of Alexandros, who would most likely be surrounded and destroyed.
The reversed formation on Issus was a careful calculation by Alexandros, who was absolutely confident in the destructive power of the Hetairoi cavalry and the Macedonian massed infantry.

イッソスの戦いの前の両軍の移動経路

11. Darius departs from Sochoi
Various historians record the reasons that led to Darius' decision to advance from Sochoi to Cilicia. Darius is said to have disobeyed his marching advice and marched himself into an isthmus unfavorable to a large army based on his cavalry. Perhaps the Greek mercenary captains, who later submitted to Alexandros, retrospectively and with some exaggeration, claimed that Darius' military leaders had not heeded their advice. Amyntas, son of Antiochos, proposed a decisive battle at Sochoi. [97]
Thymondas, son of Mentor, recommended retreating to Mesopotamia and dividing Darius' large army. [98]

So, would Darius have considered Sochoi as the final battleground?
The exact location of Sochoi is unknown, except that it is located in the Assyria region, two days from the Syrian Gates. [99]
Sochoi may have been a 'gathering place' or a 'defense place' to prevent incursions into Mesopotamia rather than a 'place of decisive battle'.
For the Greek mercenaries landing in Tripolis, the Egyptian and Syrian troops, and the troops rushing from the Asia Minor, Sochoi was the perfect place, since it was hidden from the enemy's sight in Cilicia.
Darius dispatched the satrap of Syria to the Syrian Gates to prevent further enemy incursions and set up a "gathering place" some distance away. There were at least two battles fought on the plain around Sochoi during Roman times. [100]
The area around Sochoi seems to have been a place of clash of forces. However, in order to show the dignity of the great Persian king, Darius had to be an absolutely strong king who crushed the enemy instead of waiting for the enemy.

Concerning the timing of Darius' departure, plausible reasons are given, such as "Winter is approaching and it will be difficult to secure food." [101]
But it is presumed that it was after Thymondas arrived with a Greek mercenary force and sent the lepers of the battle to Damaskos under the command of Kophen son of Artabazos. [102]
After the battle of Issus, Parmenion sent a letter from Damaskos to Alexandros, and the list of confiscated items included 200 cooks, etc., who were necessary until just before the march, it is believed that the deportation of these people to Damaskos was shortly before departure. [103]

Why, then, did they choose to bypass the Amanos Mountains, where they might have crossed paths, instead of pushing through the Syrian Gates with a large force?
In 480 BC, a Persian army led by Xerxes invaded Greece and was hampered by a small number of enemies at Thermopylae. [104]
Also, in the era of Artoxerxes II, the Datames rebellion that occurred in the Asia Minor was fought by a large army dispatched by the Great King in a narrow space, and could not win against an enemy with only 1 in 12 troops. [105]
It is thought that these things remained in the minds of the Darius military leadership, and that they dared to carry out the large detour operation.

Darius decided to station enough forces to hold off the Alexandros army for a long time even if they tried to cross the Syrian Gates, then advance to Cilicia and defeat the Alexandros army with overwhelming cavalry force.
The Persian garrison of the Syrian Gates is presumed to have been led by the Syrian satrap, whose name is not visible in the Battle of Issus. After the battle, when Parmenion approached Damaskos for seizure, the Syrian satrap had already returned. [106]
This is possible in view of the fact that he betrayed Darius and willingly offered his goods to Alexandros. He was probably the first to flee when he heard of the defeat of Darius' army from the Greece mercenaries led by Amyntas and others who had fled from the battlefield.
The advance of Darius' army to Sochoi is estimated to have been on October 21st.
The Darius army moved north from Sochoi through the plains on the east side of the Amanos Mountains for four days, crossing the present-day Bahce Pass (about 600 m above sea level) or the Hasanbeyli Pass (about 1,200 m above sea level) further south, went out to Cilicia. The distance from the east branch point to the west confluence of both roads is about 44 km because the Bahce Pass runs northward, and the road passing Hasanbeyli Pass is about 23 km. However, Hasanbeyli Pass suddenly climbs for about 7km with an altitude difference of 600m, and then it becomes a steep descent. On the other hand, the Bahce pass has an elevation difference of 400m and continues for about 8km, but after that it becomes a gradual descent. Perhaps overnight in the mountains, the bulk of the army advanced through the Bahce Pass, while the light forces used the Hasanbeyli Pass.
It is estimated that Darius' army crossed the Amanos Mountains and entered the plains on October 28th.

12. Pinarus Camp of Darius' Army
Darius gave his army a final rest on the plains within a day's journey north of the city of Issus.
In the early hours of October 30th, he sent an advance party to the town of Issus, capturing it and taking prisoner the remaining wounded. The town of Issus was a small town with an anchorage for ships. [107]
During Cyrus the Younger's Rebellion, 800 hoplites from Sparta's fleet landed. [108]
At this time, 60 ships were anchored along Cyrus' camp, who, like Darius, seems to have encamped near the shore near the Pinarus River. [109]
When the Darius army heard from the cooperating Issus inhabitants that the forces of Alexandros were advancing in the direction of Syria, they followed the enemy to the Pillar of Jonah. [110]
However, Darius' army, feeling uneasy about the gradually narrowing terrain, and anticipating enemy resistance at the "defile", decided to set up camp on the banks of the Pinarus River and consider a course of action. [111].
The "Pillar of Jonah" had walls on the Cilicia side and the Syrian side, and the distance between them was 3 stadia (about 555 m), and the passage was narrow. Moreover, there was a river about 30m wide, which made it difficult for the enemy to break through by force. They had to flanker from both sides with ships, but Darius had no ships. Moreover, when Darius saw that the land beyond the Pinarus was narrow and rough, he found himself at a disadvantage while the enemy had an advantage. [112]
Thinking that Alexandros' army was encamped on the plains of Cilicia, Darius, who had advanced, was disappointed to find that the situation was no different from that of Sochoi. In the end, he only found himself in a disadvantageous position, and the enemy's position was beyond a barrier against which a large army could advance. Therefore, Darius may have decided to set up camp in a larger area to see the movements of Alexandros's army.
Darius' army encamped by the river Pinarus. [113]
Curtius tells us that Darius' army crossed the Pinarus and took up positions with their backs to the river to prevent them from fleeing. It is thought that the foreign soldiers were afraid of desertion, so they encamped on the south side of the Pinarus River, and the Persian regular army, led by Darius, set up their headquarters on the north side of the Pinarus River. [114]
Callisthenes also reports that Darius, learning of the advance of Alexandros' army, lined up his infantry in their original positions, and alludes to the fact that there were many troops on the other side of the Pinarus. [115]
Arrianus, who tells of how Darius' army learned of the approach of Alexandros' army and formed battle lines, seems to support this presumption. In other words, 30,000 Persian cavalry and 20,000 Persian light infantry units, which were initially on the north side of the Pinarus River, were forced to cross the Pinarus River to the south. [116]
Darius then advanced his cavalry forces to the south of the foreigners, aligning them east and west. Then the cavalry forced the Gentiles up from the south to cross the Pinarus River and form a line of battle on the north side of the river. When this was done, most of the Persian cavalry was placed on the sea side, and some on the hill side, but because of the narrowness and lack of space, they were eventually placed on the sea side. [117]
Arrianus also notes that at several points along the Pinarus River "stockade" were routed. [118]
The Darius army was so busy lining up a large force that it is doubtful that such a construction could have been put in place at the time of this deployment. If this description is true, it would be appropriate to assume that it was for the purpose of preventing the desertion of the ethnic groups mentioned above.
Darius' army encamped on the banks of the Pinarus on October 31st, the day before the battle.

13. Darius Military Strength
Of the strength of Darius' army, Plutarch and Arrianus give 600,000 men, Diodorus and Justinus give 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. [119]
Only Curtius gives details of the tribes and their respective numbers of infantry and cavalry, adding 220,000 infantry, 62,200 cavalry, and 30,000 Greek mercenaries. [120]
These are only the troops assembled at Babylon, and it is believed that the Greek mercenaries joined at Sochoi. [121]
The troops led by the aforementioned Egyptian satrap Sabaces and the Syrian troops had already arrived in Sochoi, and it is believed that they secured the Syrian Gates and the area around the camp and waited for Darius' arrival.
Other local Persian forces fleeing from the Asia Minor and Cilicia are believed to have been waiting there as well. As for the Syrian and Egyptian forces, 300,000 men reported by Xenophon would have been a considerable number, if not more, and if these were included, Curtius would be on a par with other historians. [122]
However, it is quite possible that each historian is referring to the same original historical sources, so it is extremely unreasonable to use this number as the actual number of troops that Darius mobilized on Issus.
Plutarch reports that over 110,000 enemies were slain in the Battle of Issus. [123]
This number seems to be the most reasonable number for Darius' army including the garrison of the Syrian Gates. The total of 111,000 killed and captured on Darius' side by Justinus is a staggering figure. [124]
Arrianus reports that the Greek mercenaries in Darius' army numbered 30,000 in the front lines of battle. [125]
Curtius also records that Thymondas brought 30,000 Greek mercenaries. [126]
Both historians seem to have based it on the primary sources of Ptolemy, son of Lagus.
This number of mercenaries appears to have been an approximate number seen by Ptolemy, who was in the right- flank cavalry unit with Alexandros at the time, and the actual number appears to have been much lower. According to various historical sources, the number of Greek mercenaries who escaped from Issus is about 16,000. It is unlikely that the remaining 14,000 were killed or fled to pieces, so the actual number of Greek mercenaries may have been just under 20,000.
The number of Greek mercenaries in the Persian Empire is said to be 50,000 at the time Alexandros began his eastern campaign, but this number seems rather unreasonable. [127]
It seems to be a simple sum of the 20,000 who participated in the Battle of Granikos and the number of participants in the Battle of Issus. [128]
The number of prisoners taken by the Greek mercenaries in the Battle of Granikos was estimated at 2,000, which is generally a reasonable number, but the total number of participants seems to be too high. [129]
At this time as well, it is difficult to think that all the remaining men were killed in action, and most probably escaped. During the Issus war, some mercenary units were active against the resistance forces such as Chios in the Aegean Sea, and not all of them were mobilized by Issus. There is also a record that Pharnabazos hurriedly transported 1,500 mercenary troops from Synops to Chios after hearing that Issus had been defeated. [130]
Pharnabazos, who succeeded Memnon as Commander of the Persian Imperial Fleet, ordered by Darius to hand over the Greek mercenaries, which were besieging Mitylene of Lesbos, to Thymondas, son of Mentor, in Lycia. [131]
Shortly before this, Mitylene fell and the Greek mercenary forces were no longer needed. [132]
Thymondas in Lycia gathered a force of Greek mercenaries from nearby, landed at Tripolis in Phoenicia from Lycia, and joined Darius at Sochoi. [133]
As a result, however, Halikarnassos' resistance was annihilated by the remaining forces of Alexandros' army. [134]
Regarding the time when the Greek mercenary unit joined the Darius army in Sochoi, it is believed that it was just before the Darius army departed, as it is said that the Greek mercenary unit had heard the opinions of the commanders of the mercenary unit and planned a strategy. [135]

14. Reversal of the Alexandros Army
Historians are ambivalent about when Alexandros learned of Darius's advance into Issus. The most obvious positional relationship was Callisthenes, the official philosopher who accompanied Alexandros on his expedition to the east. He reported that after Alexandros' forces passed through the "Pillar of Jonah" there was a distance of 100 stadia (about 18.5 km) between the two. [136]
Assuming that the Pinarus River is now the Payas River, Alexandros' army would have been marching halfway between the "Pillar of Jonah" and the present-day city of Iskenderun, or might have been in a camp near it.
The "camp" is near Myriandrus, but not near Myriandrus, which is a day's journey from the "Pillar of Jonah", and Arrianus seems to have referred to this place as "near Myriandrus". [137]
At the time, Iskenderun was not a town, but Alexandros built the town after the battle of Issus and named it Alexandreia, and since there was no corresponding place name, it is assumed that the city was named "near Myriandrus." [138]
The camp is located about 7.3km south of the "Pillar of Jonah", around a hill of about 120m above sea level. Even if Darius' army breaks through the Syrian Gates and heads for Cilicia, Parmenion's advance party can deal with it in a timely manner. It was a suitable location.
Neither the Macedonian wounded who remained in the city of Issus, nor the scouts, were the first to announce the advance of Darius' army to Issus. [139]
In fact, there may have been reports of scouts guarding the route through the Amanos Gate. After this, Alexandros sent scouts to Issus to check the situation. Arrianus records that he had confirmed it from the sea in his ship. [140]
Curtius, however, writes that Alexandros sent a scouting party in advance to see if Darius himself was on the march or was led by a mere general. [141]
This is reminiscent of land-based reconnaissance, but in fact both reconnaissance operations may have been taken to improve accuracy.
When Curtius tried to return to "Pillar of Jonah" without being able to confirm the main force of Darius' army, the reconnaissance party dispatched by Alexandros was blocked by the enemy's advance troops, etc. He confirmed the army and reported that the fire began to shine before long.
Curtius reports that when the scouts sent by Alexandros tried to return to "Pillar of Jonah" without being able to see the main Darius force because they were blocked by enemy advance forces and others, they saw enough troops to fill the land in the fields of Issus behind them, and eventually the fire began to shine. [142]
The scouts were dispatched late in the afternoon, so that Alexandros' recognition of the arrival of Darius' army was likely in the early afternoon. Thus, it was on the evening of October 31st that Alexandros recognized the forces of Darius himself.

Alexandros sent his entire army in three separate marches to the Pillar of Jonah. This would have been the best way to make his men less fatigued and keep them fit for battle. If the entire army marched out of the camp at once, a line of 32,124 infantrymen in eight lines, one meter apart, would form a line of over four kilometers. One hour must pass between the departure of the first unit and the departure of the last unit.
In the evening he sent out a small force of cavalry and archers as the first force to reconnoiter and secure the defile. [143]
After this, Alexandros fed the whole army, and let half of the army rest well until midnight. Alexandros himself ascended to the heights near his camp, prayed for his victory and made sacrifices to the local patrons, and then he set off with the other half of his army. [144]
Alexandros passed the Pillar of Jonah at midnight, causing his men to rest until dawn on the nearby rocks. [145]
Meanwhile, the latecomers departed at midnight, arrived at the "Pillar of Jonah" at dawn, and marched in full force to the battlefields of Issus. [146]
At this time, assuming that the "Pillar of Jonah" was occupied by the enemy, the triremes used for reconnaissance of the sea route would have gone north in parallel with the first party. It was difficult to capture the "Pillar of Jonah" by attacking from land alone.
From the above it can be seen that the whole army of Alexandros approached the battle with great calmness and orderliness. It is certain that an unexpected enemy suddenly appeared behind them and rushed toward them. It was a very carefully calculated strategy.

15. Alexandros Army garrison of the Syrian Gates
Not all of Darius' army went from Sochoi to the Amanos Gate. They left many garrisons at the Syrian Gates, where they expected the enemy to come.
Alexandros could well have been in trouble if Darius followed the pincer strategy of the Byzantine emperor Heraclius. However, Alexandros would have left a garrison to hold this gate. The details of this garrison are unknown, but it is believed to have been part of the Greek allied infantry included in Parmenion's advance force.
The right flank of the line for the Battle of Issus says "Peloponnesus and other allied cavalry" but the name of the "Greece allied force" is not visible. [147]
Of the troops dispatched by the Corinthian Alliance, it seems that the troops from Greece, other than those from the Peloponnesus Peninsula, remained for the defense.
The Greek allied infantry had 7,000 men when they left for the eastern expedition, but soon after crossing the Hellespontus Strait they were joined by 10,000 men advance party under Parmenion. [148]
It is presumed that this number also included Macedonians and Greek mercenaries, but most likely the forces contributed by the Corinthian League. [149]
The number of Greek soldiers, not counting cavalry, who took part in the Battle of Plataea a century and a half ago, reportedly numbered 160,000, is too small to be counted at the time of departure. [150]
At Kelainai, 2,000 men remained in the garrison. [151]
Just before that, when the fleet was disbanded at Miletos, the crew should have been incorporated into the Greek alliance infantry unit, but there is no mention of this number in any historical sources. [152]
However, given that Callisthenes states that Alexandros' army had 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry at the time of the invasion of Cilicia, it seems that the number of crew members incorporated into the infantry unit at the time of the disbandment of the fleet was 2,000. [153]
For only 3,000 Macedonian infantry joined at Gordion are recorded as newcomers from the time of departure to the invasion of Cilicia. [154]
Since Alexandros instructed Hegelochos in Gordion to reorganize the fleet, it is conceivable that he took the crew from the time of disbandment again. [155]
However, at this time, Alexandros gave Hegelochos military funds and instructed them to gather a fleet, but there are records that it was difficult to gather them, so it seems that the crew was procured locally. [156]

From the above it is estimated that the Greek infantry force that crossed the Cilician gates numbered 17,500. Of these, 60%, or 10,500 infantrymen, from the Corinthian League outside the Peloponnesus Peninsula were estimated to have been retained to defend the Syrian Gates. The Greek allied infantry was placed in the rear and did not participate in the battle during the Granikos battle. During the battle for Issus, the Greek mercenary force was stationed at the back of the line as a reserve. [157]
Since the Persian Greek mercenaries were stationed in the center of the Persian line of battle, it is thought that Alexandros was suspicious of their fighting spirit.

The "Peloponnesus" forces that were forced to participate in the Battle of Issus are likely detachments from Polis with no Greek mercenary forces on Darius' side.
The fact that 8,000 Greek mercenary troops on the Darius side, led by Amyntas and others, passed through the Syrian Gates after the Battle of Issus seems to have been possible because they were from the same country as those guarding the defile. [158]

アレクサンドロス軍のミュリアンドロスからの進軍

16. Issus emergence of Alexandros forces
Curtius notes that it was 30 stadia (about 5.6 km) from the "Pillar of Jonah" to Darius' camp on Issus. [159]
However, Callisthenes said Alexandros moved forward in line from 40 stadia (about 7.4 km) away. At first glance it seems to be contradictory, but it seems that the perspective of the author of the first historical document is different, just like the march to "Pillar of Jonah" mentioned above. The author from whom Curtius' description was based may have stated the distance from the head of the army. If 32,124 infantry and 5,500 cavalry are marching in a small area, what is the length of the force? Curtius states that the path of march was narrow and he initially advanced 32 rows deep, and it appears that eight men could barely spread out. [160]
With 4 cavalry, with 1m front and back spacing for infantry and 3m for cavalry, the total length of the army is about 8km without taking into account the spacing between units. However, if it was only infantry, it would be about 4km, and if the distance between the front and back was shortened at the starting point and the next unit waited on the rocks on both sides of the road, it would be less than 1km. A fast-paced cavalry unit or a train that didn't need to line up may have waited in front of the "Pillar of Jonah" and followed behind. The hoplites were at the front of the march, followed by the cavalry, and the trains at the rear. [161]
Also, "Pillar of Jonah" is 3 stadia (about 555m) long, and if the point where Callisthenes said the line of battle was formed and advanced was immediately after leaving "Pillar of Jonah" (north side of the defile), the Pinarus river should be identified with the present-day Payas river. Callisthenes' description of 100 stadia (about 18.5 km) between them becomes meaningless if the Deli Chai River is about 13.6 km north of it. [162]
Alexandros' forces marched north at dawn from the Pillar of Jonah towards Darius' army encamped on Issus. [163]

Sunrise time on November 1st is 6:02 am. It was probably around 5:30 am when the sky turned white and we were able to advance without lighting torches. It was 30 stadia (about 5.6 km) before Darius when it became possible to form a line of battle through the isthmus to some extent. [164]
At first, it was barely possible to go through the narrow road with 32 rows deep. [165]
With 512 men per company, Darius' army would have seen eight men spread out and marching forward. Of these, depending on the size of the land, there were 16 in the front row, and then 32. How did the soldiers of the Darius army feel when they saw the enemy approaching in a horizontal line with no space between them and the sea on the right? Fear must have increased rapidly. When it finally faced the enemy, it was eight rows shallower than usual. [166]
Alexandros' forces formed the densest phalanx, with the lateral spacing of the soldiers half the normal.

17. Dismay and formation of Darius' army
Alexandros' advance into Issus did not come as a surprise attack, but it had enough of an impact on Darius's army to give him equal or less shock. Alexandros forced his march at night, and made his way to Issus at dawn, in order not to dislodge Darius' camp from its perfect position. If the Darius army were to come towards their own army first, it would be a battle in a narrow passage, and the battle would become bogged down. At that time, the numbers of the enemy threatened to make it impossible to hit Darius far behind and achieve a decisive victory.
Plutarch writes that Darius, seeing Issus as a narrow and barren land, realized that the enemy had an advantage and himself at a disadvantage, as Issus suddenly turned into a battlefield. [167]
Justinus also reports the turmoil of Darius' army, saying that Darius did not hesitate to arrange his lines. [168]
Curtius left an important note here as well. In other words, Darius' army was at this time ready to depart, but not at all ready for battle. [169]
This is probably true, as Plutarch also notes that Darius was about to withdraw to return to his "former camp". [170]
Since Plutarch omits the waypoints on the way, the "previous camp" can be taken as "Sochoi", but it is not so, and it seems that it was the plains near the town of Issus in the sense of the previous camp.
The Alexandros army struck at just the right moment. From the beginning, Alexandros envisioned a battle on the battlefield of Issus, and I think he planned to develop a line of battle along the way from Issus to the vicinity of Myriandrus. In addition, he was ready to survey his camp. [171]
Darius, on the other hand, must have thought that Alexandros would never turn his army back against a large army, and had not sent a garrison, let alone a scout, to the Pillar of Jonah.
Darius had 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 light infantry on the right sea side, 30,000 Greek mercenaries in the center, 60,000 mixed troops from various ethnic groups called Cardaces on both sides, and 20,000 on the left mountain side. Darius himself was in the rear of the center, surrounded by a large group.

18. Alexandros army strength
There is no written record of the strength of the forces of Alexandros who took part in the Battle of Issus. Polybius alone estimates 42,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. [172]
A detailed analysis based on the estimated military strength from the start of the eastern expedition is as follows. [173]

(1) Hetairoi Cavalry (Cavalry Fellow) Macedonians
They started with 1,800 horsemen, but 25 were killed at the Battle of the Granikos River. [174].
At this time, it is thought that there were of course those who were injured and unable to participate in the battle because their wounds had not healed.
They are believed to have been repatriated or left behind at garrison posts along the way.
I estimate this number to be two-thirds of the death toll. During the subsequent expedition to the east, Alexandros himself was seriously injured, but since he was recovering, it was unlikely that he would be unable to return to military service due to the injury. It is therefore estimated that 20 repatriates at the time of the Battle of the Granikos River. Since then, Gordion has replenished 300 cavalry, so it is estimated that a total of 2,050 participated. [175]

(2) Prodromoi(outpost cavalry) Paiones, Thracians
They took part in a total of 1,200 horses, 900 at the time of their departure, which had been replenished with 300 just before the Battle of Issus. [176]
Curtius writes that at the time of the battle, the Persian forces on the hill were opposed by Agrianes, a newcomer from Thrace. [177]
Arrianus states that he deployed 300 cavalry against the enemy on the hill. From these I can see that the newcomer Agrianes had 300 cavalry.
Callisthenes also reports that Alexandros' army was joined by 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry during the invasion of Cilicia. [178]
Only 300 Macedonian cavalry and 200 Thessalian cavalry are recorded at Gordion as cavalry replenishment after the eastern expedition. [179]
So they would have joined just before the battle of Issus. They were operating in Halikarnassos with 3,000 Greek mercenaries. However, it is presumed that after Ptolemy's victory, it became unnecessary and was directed to Cilicia for the Battle of the Issus, joining Alexandros' forces near Castabalum. [180]

(3) Thessalian cavalry
They started with 1,800 horsemen, and about 90 were killed in the Battle of Granikos. [181]
It is estimated that 60 horsemen were repatriated at this time or remained in the Asia Minor. After this, 200 horsemen were recruited in Gordion, and it is estimated that a total of 1,850 horsemen participated. [182]

(4) Greek allied cavalry
They departed with 600 horses, and 200 remained in Karia as a garrison. It is estimated that a total of 400 horsemen participated.

(5) Hypaspists (infantry guardsmen) Macedonians
They had 3,000 men at the start, and since the number of casualties along the way was completely unknown, they assumed the numbers as they were.

(6) Pezhetairoi (infantry companion) Macedonians
They had 9,000 men at the start, and about 30 killed at the Battle of the Granikos River. [183]
It is estimated that 20 men were repatriated at this time or remained in the Asia Minor.
About 76 men were killed in Karia and Pisidia. [184]
It is estimated that 50 men were repatriated at this time or remained in the Asia Minor.
Since then, Gordion has recruited 3,000 men, for a total estimated attendance of 11,824. [185]

(7) Greek Allied Infantry
They started with 7,000 men and were joined by an advance party of 10,000 men.
At Miletos the fleet was disbanded and the crew incorporated into the infantry. Their number is estimated at 2,000. [186]
After that, 1,500 men remained as Kelainai's garrison. [187]
At Gordion, 150 Eleioi joined, but it is understood that Elis, who did not contribute at the time of departure, joined the force later, and was probably included in the force at the time of departure. [188]
An estimated 10,500 men were left behind for the Syrian Gates garrison when it turned around from near Myriandrus. Only troops from Peloponnesus took part in the Battle of Issus, totaling an estimated 7,000.

(8) Greek Mercenaries
They numbered 5,000 when they departed, but at Miletos 300 mercenaries surrendered and joined Alexandros' army. [189]
Since then, 3,000 men have remained as Karia's garrison. [190]
After the victory of Ptolemy with the aforementioned Thracians, it is probable that he went to Cilicia to take part in the battle of Issus, but was too late for the battle. [191]
The total was therefore estimated at 2,300.

(9) Thracian Troops
They were 7,000 when they started, and all participated.

(10) Agrianes Infantry and Crete Archery Troops
They were 1,000 when they started, and all participated.

Altogether, there were 32,124 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, for a total of 37,624 men.

イッソスの戦いにおけるアレクサンドロス軍の戦列

19. Alexandros military line of battle
Polybius, based on the sightings of Callisthenes, describes the width of the Issus battlefield as 14 stadia (about 2.59 km) from the foot of the eastern hills to the sea. [192]
It also states that the width of the Alexandros army line was 11 stadia (about 2.035 km). [193]
From this it seems that the line of Alexandros' army extended from the coastline to the hills to the east, and then turned into a hook-like shape against the enemy on the hills. [194]
There was a space of about 565m from the rightmost Thracian cavalry unit to the foot of the hill.
Curtius reports that while advancing, Alexandros forced Parmenion on the left flank to shift his line of battle to the left so that there would be no gap on the seaward side. [195]
It seems that the right flank of the hill side was considerably barren and unsuitable for cavalry operations, so it seems that they decided that the Persian cavalry would not be able to turn around from this direction.

It is presumed that the line of Alexandros' army, extending from the coastline to the hills, was as follows.
First, 400 Greek allied cavalry arrayed four lines deep 200m, followed by 1,850 Thessalian cavalry 18 lines deep.
To its right was a mass of 7,000 Peloponnesian infantry in eight lines deep and 393.8m wide. From then, each corps of Macedonian hoplite Pezhetairoi, 11,824 men, was lined up eight lines deep and 665.1m wide.
As for the names of the corps, in order: Craterus son of Alexandros, Amyntas son of Andromenes, Ptolemy son of Seleukos, Meleager son of Neoptolemus, Perdiccas son of Orontes, Coenus son of Polemokrates.
To the right of this, 3,000 guard infantry, led by Nicanor son of Parmenion, stood in eight lines deep, 168.8 m wide.
The Hetairoi cavalry force of 2,050, led by Alexandros himself, occupied a width of 100m in 41 lines with 50 on each line.
Each troop of 200 cavalry lined up in four to five lines.
The 200 men of Peroidas son of Menestheus and the 200 men of Pantordanos son of Kleandros, who were in the rear row, were temporarily placed on the side of the hill to meet the enemy on the hill.
500 Agrianes slingers, led by Attalos, were also placed with 300 Thracian cavalry, and the whole line of battle was bent into a hooked hand.

In addition, throwers were temporarily placed in front of the battle line as a disturbance force in the first battle, but the formation was as follows. In front of the Peloponnesians on the sea side were 7,000 Thracian javelin-men under Sitalces and half of the Crete archers under Antiochos, 250 men.
The remaining 250 men of the Crete archers were placed in front of the Macedonian infantry mass.
In front of the Hetairoi cavalry were the Prodromoi cavalry under Protomachos and 900 Paiones cavalry under Ariston.
The Greek mercenary force of 2,300 men was placed at the rear of the entire army, lined up in two lines deep 517.5m wide in length and width in case the enemy were to come around behind them. Part of this mercenary force was also temporarily placed on the right flank to guard against the enemy on the hill.
As for the Thessalian cavalry, Alexandros kept them on the right flank with the Hetairoi cavalry when forming the line and advancing. However, Alexandros, seeing that almost all of Darius' cavalry was concentrated on the right flank, circled behind the phalanx of infantry and placed them under Parmenion's command on the left. [196]
Curtius notes that this measure was taken only after the battle had begun, but it was too late, and 400 Greek allied cavalry would have broken through. It is presumed that it was in the midst of advancing the line of battle, as Arrianus says.
It would have been possible for the cavalry to move covertly from the right flank to the left flank behind the infantry due to the rough terrain during the advance.
As for the troops stationed against the enemy on the hill, they easily abandoned their posts when Agrianes and others attacked. Against the enemy on the hill, only 300 Thracian cavalry could be dealt with, the rest being directed against the enemy ahead. [197]

20. Progress of the battle
Alexandros occasionally halted the line, which tended to move quickly due to the vigorous fighting spirit of his men, and allowed them to advance without gaps in the line. [198]
Arrianus reports that, as soon as Alexandros was within range of the arrows, he rushed into the Pinarus River and charged Darius' left flank in order to reduce the damage. [199]
Curtius reports that the battle began with a charge of Persian cavalry against the Greek allied cavalry on the left flank. [200]
Although the descriptions of the start of the battle between the two differ, it is likely that it was almost at the same time.
According to the descriptions of each historian, the course of the first battle would have been roughly as follows.
First, on the right flank, the Prodromoi cavalry of 900 under the command of Protomachos charged with javelins at the archers lined up along the river Pinarus in front of Darius' army, firing arrows, and they reduced the number of arrows that flew.
A force of 3,000 infantry guards under Nicanor, assisted by 500 Agrianes slingers, across the Pinarus River, and dispersed the archers.
In the meantime, 2,050 Hetairoi cavalry under Philotas charged in a wedge formation.
The Philotas corps swung heavily into the 30,000-strong Kardakes (Various Peoples Infantry) on the left flank of Darius' army, making a wide counter-clockwise turn toward Darius' position in the center, gradually closing in on him.
The Kardakes were made up of many different peoples and did not speak the language.
There was no chain of command between the ethnic groups. It seems that they had almost no will to fight, just rushing to respond to the summons.
It is said that the soldiers who responded to the call for the Battle of Gaugamela later had no weapons, and some cavalrymen had only throwing javelins, so they were provided with shields and swords. [201]
For the Hetairoi cavalry unit, composed of veteran warriors who value honor and are full of fighting spirit, it was a battle against a rabble.
However, the penetration of the right flank of Alexandros' army was a great burden to the Macedonian infantry corps as they tried to maintain their line of battle one after another across the Pinarus River.
At the location where the abatis was installed, a gap arose between it and the right flank that had crossed earlier.
It is believed that the gap occurred in Ptolemy's force, which suffered many casualties and whose commander himself was killed in action.
Not overlooking this gap, Darius' side of the Greek mercenary forces planned their entry.
At this point, the Guards infantry, which had overwhelmed the enemy by charging in from the right flank, turned to the center of the line and cut into the flank of this Greek mercenary force, overwhelming the enemy.
As a whole, the right flank of Alexandros' army envelops the enemy, causing Darius's army to suddenly float, and finally to rout. [202].

On the left flank, the Thessalian cavalry was struggling under the charge of a large mass of Persian cavalry.
Curtius reports that once a company of Thessalian cavalry was trampled by the enemy, they circled their horses and spread out before reentering the battle.
The Persian cavalry was worn by horses and cavalrymen, which were woven together from thin iron plates, and were heavy and impeded movement, making it difficult to attack individually. [203]
Taking advantage of their lightness, the Thessalian cavalry turned and retreated, then regrouped and charged the Persian cavalry from long range, throwing spears.
Xenophon notes from his own experience as a cavalryman that he prefers throwing his spear from a distance. That's why, he says, it gives him time to turn around and pick up another javelin. [204]
The Persian cavalry was so densely packed that the spears were probably used as impaling tools.
Curtius describes how the javelin was useless and the cavalry drew their swords and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. [205]
Under these circumstances, the Thessalian cavalry's circling, wave-like method of warfare was highly effective.

ダレイオス軍の野営状況から戦列完成までの経過

21. The Escape of Darius
Arrianus records that when Darius' left flank was crushed by Alexandros' cavalry charge, Darius fled in chariots, switched to a horse on the way. [206]
Plutarch reports that Darius fled 4-5 stadia (about 830m) ahead of Alexandros, so he could not be taken prisoner.
Other historians report that there was a fierce battle around the king, as if Darius held his ground. [207]
However, it will not be easy to fend off his pursuers and escape in the chaos of retreating with many casualties.
As Plutarch puts it, it's presumed that he fled before the enemy could get within range of the javelin.
Curtius writes that Darius, afraid of being caught alive, jumped on a horse that was ready behind him and fled. [208]
Many horses were prepared for such an escape, and Darius was able to fend off his pursuers. When the great king of the Persian Empire marched out with his army, he was accompanied by 200-400 royal horses. [209]
Darius' escape route to the town of Onchae, presumed to be identical to Sochoi, is unknown.
It is impossible for Darius to break through the midst of the battle to the south and escape through two more gates.
Darius is thought to have fled north to escape the enemy approaching from the south and returned the way he came through the Gate of Amanos.
Alexandros chased for 200 stadia (about 36.8km), but it became dark and he could not see his feet, so he gave up the pursuit and turned back. [210]
It was midnight when Alexandros reached camp. [211]
Sunset in November on Issus is before 5pm. He also factored in twilight hours, and he tracked for about three hours until just after 6pm. The return route would have been at less than normal foot speed given the clashes with routed soldiers in the dark and the fatigue of his horse.
It must have taken Alexandros more than six hours to get back to camp.

22. Darius's army after the rout
Four large groups of Darius' forces are recorded as having routed from Issus.
(1) A force of 8,000 Greek mercenaries fled to Tripolis in Phoenicia via the Syrian Gates. From there they crossed over to Cyprus in fleets. [212]
A force of 4,000 Greek mercenaries led by Amyntas also headed for Egypt.
He captured Pelusium at the mouth of the Nile from the Persian garrison in Egypt, and even defeated the garrison at Memphis, but was destroyed in a counterattack. [213]

(2) Curtius reports that no one in the group centered on Darius could keep up with Darius' speed as he changed horses one after another.
Moreover, Curtius strangely records that at Onchae a force of 4,000 Greek mercenaries received the king. [214]
Onchae is marked as leading straight to Thapsakos, presumed to be a town near Aleppo. It is presumed that the Greek mercenaries who fled the battlefield via the Syrian Gates arrived at Onchae earlier than Darius.

(3) Some groups fled to the Asia Minor with the generals of the Darius army. They joined the tribes of Kappadokia and Paphlagonia in an attempt to recapture their lost lands, and fought three times with Antigonus, satrap of Lydia, and were defeated three times. [215]
Antigonus has given much of his garrison to the battle against Issus, but may have also sided with the local Alexandros faction.

(4) Curtius writes that a force of 8,000 Greek mercenaries crossed over to Peloponnesus, joined with King Agis of Sparta, and was about to challenge Antipatros, who was keeping Macedonian homeland away. [216]
Of these, 4,000 are believed to have been those who had parted from Amyntas and Cyprus, as mentioned above, and had returned to Peloponnesus.
The remaining 4,000 are estimated to have crossed the sea by robbing ships anchored at Soloi and Mallos. Ships from those towns also rushed to support the Battle of Tyre later, so it is thought that there were many ships in those towns. [217]

23. Finally
Darius' defeat was due to his ignorance of Alexandros' strong personality and talent.
It was contrary to the fact that successive Persian kings have staked the fate of the empire on a single decisive battle. Darius lost many of his elite troops at the Battle of the Granikos River. In the battle of Issus he did not wait for the aid of the brave Baktrian cavalry and the Indian tribes. He devoted more of his manpower to defending the Syrian Gates. These will be the culprits.

Darius underestimated the strength of Alexandros' army so much that his strategy was erratic. Darius pursued from Issus in the direction of the "Pillar of Jonah" into the isthmus and realized his own danger. At that time, it was fatal not to hold the Gate that the enemy might face. It is a pre-army problem to hear from a farmer that the enemy is coming. [218] More fatally, perhaps the greatest failure was the mismanagement of the Persian cavalry, the main force of Darius' army, overwhelmingly superior in numbers and loyal to Darius. Darius insisted on using the Pinarus River as a defensive line, neglecting to take up positions to the north, where more space would be available. As a result, Darius' cavalry were repulsed with heavy casualties as the narrow breakthrough was blocked by the Thessalian cavalry. However, it must be thought that even if Darius had staked the fate of the empire in a single decisive battle with the Baktrian cavalry, the strongest of the Persian army, and the Indian war elephants, he would not have been able to win against Alexandros.

Alexandros' army had two things that Darius' army did not.
(1) One is the general advantage.
A commander's rank and courage in battle are inversely proportional, and the courage of a commander-in-chief is said to be rare since ancient times. [219]
In the Alexandros army, the name of the unit commander was visible in the small number of casualties, and a culture was fostered that respects death in battle as an honor. In particular, there are many anecdotes about the bravery of Alexandros, who led the army, and the number of injuries he suffered during the eastern expedition was more than that of ordinary soldiers. [220]

(2) The other is the soldier advantage.
There are two things that build a soldier's mental strength against the enemy. That is to say, the army has experienced many battles and victories, and has experienced extreme hardships on several occasions. [221]
The Macedonians in the army of Alexandros were far more brave and stalwart warrior than the Persians.

After comparing and verifying the valuable documents left by ancient historians, I found one thing about the Battle of Issus. The conclusion is that the battle of Issus was a decisive battle of Heaven and Earth. Until now, I had assumed that the large-scale battle of Gaugamela, which was set in the plains, would fall under this category because the number of participating troops was larger than that of the battle of Issus, but that was not the case. The Battle of Issus was the battle that fully demonstrated Alexandros' genius.

End